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MAJORITARIAN AND COUNTER-MAJORITARIAN 
DIFFICULTIES: DEMOCRACY, DISTRUST, AND 
DISCLOSURE IN AMERICAN LAND-USE 
JURISPRUDENCE-A RESPONSE TO PROFESSORS 
MANDELKER AND TARLOCK'S REPLY 
Robert J. Hopperton* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Professors Daniel R. Mandelker and A. Dan Tarlock, in their recent 
article in this journal entitled Two Cheers For Shifting the Presump-
tion of Validity: A Reply to Professor H opperton, l strike a Churchil-
lian chord in their defense of a presumption-based approach to judicial 
review of land-use regulations, i.e., presumption shifting may be an 
"imperfect"2 basis for activist judicial review, but it is better than the 
alternatives. They make a good case by offering some new and well-
drawn points. In this regard, they are addressing the need to "develop 
a theory of judicial review that would constrain but not chill"3 local 
non-judicial land-use decision-makers. In this effort, Professors Man-
delker and Tarlock are addressing a majoritarian difficulty-how to 
supervise through judicial review potential mischief by local officials 
elected by or responsive to majoritarian processes. To address their 
distrust of local officials, Mandelker and Tarlock argue for the "imper-
fect"4 but serviceable approach of presumption shifting. 
* Anderson Professor of Law & Values (1996-1998). J.D., University of Toledo College of Law, 
1972. 
1 Daniel R. Mandelker & A. Dan Tarlock, Two Cheers for Shifting the Presumption of Validity, 
24 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 103 (1996). 
2Id. at 111. 
3Id. 
4 See id. 
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My concern in the article5 that they are responding to, on the other 
hand, relates to a different question, a question-precedent to the one 
they address: how do we constrain judges as they exercise the power 
of judicial review, especially when the exercise of that power inevita-
bly involves those judges in a tangled "web of subjectivity?"6 I am 
concerned about the counter-majoritarian difficulty-how to limit per-
sonal predilections of unelected, life-tenured Justices.7 To address my 
concern about distrust of judicial decision-makers, I advocate a "dis-
closure principle" that extends a core principle of the Harvard Legal 
Process School of Jurisprudence.8 In short, Professors Mandelker and 
Tarlock and I are focusing on two different, but related concerns. 
Before going on, I wish to add that I am perplexed by an aspect of 
Professors Mandelker and Tarlock's "Reply." They expend substantial 
effort taking me to task for seeking heightened or activist judicial 
review9 and for the "thesis that strict scrutiny rather than a presump-
tion-shift is the best standard for judicial review."10 I am perplexed 
because I was careful in my "Presumption of Validity" articlell not 
either to propose or make arguments in favor of a "new and undefined 
non- or quasi-constitutional theory of heightened scrutiny" that they 
attribute to me.12 Rather, my project was to question the efficacy of 
presumption-shifting in land-use jurisprudence, to urge Professors 
Mandelker and Tarlock and others to re-think that position, and to 
argue that courts should seek "clarity, coherence, and integrity" re-
garding the standards of judicial review deployed in their land-use 
opinions.13 As will be seen in Sections IV through VII of this "Re-
sponse" to Professors Mandelker and Tarlock, I return to that en-
deavor herein. 
5 See generally Robert J. Hopperton, The Presumption of Validity in American Land-Use 
Law: A Substitute For Analysis, A Source of Significant Confusion, 23 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. 
REV. 301 (1996). 
6 See infra Section IV. 
7Id. 
B See BAILEY KUKLIN & JEFFREY W. STEMPEL, FOUNDATIONS OF THE LAW: AN INTERDIS-
CIPLINARY AND JURISPRUDENTIAL PRIMER 158-61 (1994); see also infra Section IV. 
9 Mandelker & Tarlock, supra note 1, at 106, 110-11. 
10 Id. at 108. 
11 Hopperton, supra note 5. 
12 Mandelker & Tarlock, supra note 1, at 11l. 
13 Hopperton, supra note 5, at 323-24. 
1997] RESPONSE TO MANDELKER & TARLOCK 543 
II. CONSTITUTIONAL CHOICES: THE SOUND AND THE FURY 
The Constitution presents all of us with an unending series of choices. 
We are called upon to choose what "the Constitution" is to include: Text? 
Intentions? (Whose?) Structural inferences? (Which ones?) Political 
and moral premises? (Of what sort?).14 
-Laurence H. Tribe 
Professors Mandelker and Tarlock in their recent article in this 
journaP5 offer an intriguing "choice" regarding the application of con-
stitutional theory to judicial review of American land-use regulations. 
Their article is a reply to my responseI6 to an earlier article of theirs.17 
In both of their pieces, they advocate use of the presumption of 
validity as a starting point for land-use jurisprudence and then, im-
portantly, presumption-shifting as a defensible method of heightened 
or activist judicial review designed to constrain but not chill local 
land-use regulatory initiatives. Mandelker and Tarlock are interested 
in constraining local regulations that create barriers to affordable 
housing and non-traditional families, or that introduce malfunctions 
into the zoning process.18 In general, their choice is a revised and 
updated variety of the process-based approach to constitutional the-
ory first articulated in the famous Carolene Products footnote I9 and 
refashioned and expanded in John Hart Ely's lucid and controversial 
1980 book, Democracy and Distrust.20 
In my 1996 article in this journal,21 I took issue with the corner-
stones of Mandelker and Tarlock's chosen approach-the presumption 
of validity and the technique of presumption-shifting. I argued that 
presumptions in the arena of land-use jurisprudence have been more 
a source of confusion than clarity and that frequently they are a 
substitute for reasoned decision-making. I suggested that the more 
important question is the standard of judicial review that a court 
14 LAURENCE H. TRIBE, CONSTITUTIONAL CHOICES 267 (1985). 
15 Mandelker & Tarlock, supra note l. 
16 Hopperton, supra note 5. 
17 Daniel R. Mandelker & A. Dan Tarlock, Shifting the Presumption of Constitutionality in 
Land-Use Law, 24 URB. LAW 1 (1992). 
18 See id. at 14-18. 
19 See id. at 18-49; see also Mandelker & Tarlock, supra note 1, at 104-05; United States v. 
Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 144, 152 nA (1938). 
20 John Hart Ely, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980). See Mandelker & Tarlock, supra note 
17, at 27; see also Mandelker & Tarlock, supra note 1, at 104-05. 
21 Hopperton, supra note 5. 
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As they indicated in their 1992 article in the Urban Lawyer,27 Profes-
sors Mandelker and Tarlock are concerned about "regulation that 
needs to be discouraged,"28 and that the officials of local units of 
government "possess both the power to redress the serious external 
costs of land development and to do great mischief by distorting 
regional social inequities and by shifting spillovers from one jurisdic-
tion to another."29 They are interested in how the courts can constrain 
these local actions but not chill local regulatory impulses, recognizing 
that local officials,30 both legislators and administrators, can do both 
good and evil. They seek ways in which courts can effectively super-
vise local units of government so as to discourage exclusionary ten-
dencies but encourage otherwise sound regulatory efforts. As they 
indicate, they are concerned primarily with the difficulties of local, 
"majoritarian tyranny."3l To this end, they assert that: 
Our modest argument in Shifting the Presumption of Validity 
boils down to this: the emphasis on the occasions when courts 
should shift the presumption of validity or constitutionality, i.e., 
to place a greater burden of justification on the local government, 
has two primary merits. First, it is a positive theory. It helps 
explain what courts are in fact doing. Second, it also is a useful 
normative starting point to construct a theory of judicial review 
because it focuses attention on the crucial issue in land-use litiga-
tion: what level of justification for a decision should be expected 
from a local government when a court suspects a process failure?32 
Here Mandelker and Tarlock are dealing with the majoritarian 
difficulty, i.e., actions by local governmental officials who are either 
elected or responsive to elected officials. In this pursuit, they concede 
that the merits of presumption analysis are "marginal and subtle"33 
but go on to rehabilitate their approach by comparing and contrasting 
it to the alternatives. 
But, compared to the other available approaches, we think that 
they are substantial and merit judicial attention. The fit between 
classic presumption law and land-use litigation is not ideal. As we 
and Professor Hopperton point out, the use of a procedural device 
27 Mandelker & Tarlock, supra note 17. 
28 [d. at 4. 
29 [d. 
30 Mandelker & Tarlock, supra note 1, at 111. 
31 [d. at 104. 
32 [d. at 107. 
33 [d. 
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to supply gaps in evidence is ill-suited for the mixed questions of 
fact and judgment that characterize land-use decisions.34 
547 
To overcome these reservations, Mandelker and Tarlock offer three 
justifications for their support of a presumption based approach. First, 
they point out that the presumption is constitutionally-based and thus 
is a permanent feature of land-use law. Second, given the uncertainty 
about appropriate standards of judicial review, a presumption-based 
approach, they assert, provides better guidance to local non-judicial 
decision-makers (because it places a higher burden of justification on 
local authorities) than do other available approaches to heightened or 
activist judicial review. Third, they suggest the presumption-based 
approach works in both constitutional and non-constitutional land-use 
cases, whereas (they believe) heightened or activist judicial scrutiny 
ultimately works only in constitutional settings.35 
Mandelker and Tarlock conclude with the following: 
The issue in disputed land-use cases is the level of justification 
that the local government must provide, not the interest of the 
party challenging the decision. The use of a presumption shift, 
imperfect as it is, can both "teach" local governments how to do 
it correctly and provide a necessary basis for both landowners and 
third parties to challenge a local decision when a local government 
cannot adequately explain a decision that is at variance with 
accepted planning theory and practice.36 
Professors Mandelker and Tarlock's defense of a presumption-based 
approach in their second article is careful and thoughtful. As a result, 
their article leads to the following observations. If Dan Mandelker and 
Dan Tarlock were sitting on the Supreme Court one would have little 
concern about subjectivity and inconsistency. They would state their 
premises, argue through to their conclusions, while considering impli-
cations along the way. One would have utmost confidence in their ability 
and willingness to disclose with reasoned elaboration their approach to 
the standards of judicial review whether it was presumption-based, or 
rights-based, or entailed some other approach. Further, one would have 
little concern about a web of subjectivity37 or a pattern of inconsistency.38 
a4 [d. 
36 Mandelker & Tarlock, supra note 1, at 108-10. 
36 [d. at 111. 
37 See infra Section IV. 
38 [d. 
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Unfortunately, Dan Mandelker and Dan Tarlock, as yet at least, do 
not sit as justices on any supreme court. 
IV. THE COUNTER-MAJORITARIAN DIFFICULTY AND THE 
PERSONAL PREDILECTIONS OF JUSTICES 
Thus the central junction, and it is at the same time the central problem, 
of judicial review: a body that is not elected or otherwise politically 
responsible in any significant way is telling the people's elected repre-
sentatives that they cannot govern as they'd like.39 
---John Hart Ely 
Mandelker and Tarlock want to use judicial review to sanction or 
penalize local officials when they misbehave. In these circumstances, 
unelected, life-tenured Justices are trumping local elected repre-
sentatives and officials who are responsible to local electoral proc-
esses. This is apparently inconsistent with the fundamental principle 
that the will of the majority should prevail in a democracy. As Alexander 
Bickel asserted over thirty years ago, judicial review is a "counter-
majoritarian force"40 in our system. 
Not only are there anti-democratic implications to judicial review, 
but as Justice Lewis Powell asserted, "there is reason for concern lest 
the only limits to such judicial intervention become the predilections 
of those who happen at the time to be Members of this Court."41 In 
the same vein, Professor Bickel was concerned about the "web of 
subjectivity,"42 i.e., the Court's tendency toward "erratic subjectivity 
of judgment, for analytical laxness, for what amounts to intellectual 
incoherence in many opinions, and for imagining too much history."43 
Moreover, Professor Tribe has suggested that Justices may manipu-
late "technical requirements to ensure a day in court for powerful 
interest groups while shutting the door on people with causes for 
which [they have] little sympathy."44 Perhaps Justice Robert H. Jack-
son best summarized the combined concerns regarding the counter-
majoritarian difficulties, personal predilections of Justices, and the 
concerns regarding the web of subjectivity, when he said, "It is hard 
39 ELY, supra note 20, at 4, 5. 
40 ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 16 (1962). 
41 Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 502 (1977). 
42 See ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE IDEA OF PROGRESS 44 (1978). 
43 [d. at 45. 
44 LAURENCE H. TRIBE, GOD SAVE THIS HONORABLE COURT 122 (1985). 
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to resist the temptation to label anything we do not like as unconsti-
tutional."45 
There are noteworthy examples of counter-majoritarian concerns 
and possible examples of personal predilections, subjectivity, and in-
consistency in Supreme Court land-use cases both recent and histori-
cal. Some recent professional commentary focuses on Justice Scalia. 
In a 1993 article critiquing the majority opinion in Lucas v. South 
Carolina Coastal Council,46 Professor William W. Fisher, III first 
describes the conventional view of Justice Scalia: "He is typically 
portrayed as a brilliant, systematic ideologue. During his career as a 
law professor, it is commonly asserted or assumed, he developed a 
detailed and consistent constitutional vision."47 Fisher then offers a 
different interpretation of Justice Scalia: 
An examination of Justice Scalia's "takings" opinions-of which 
the majority opinion in Lucas is the most recent-casts upon 
doubt about the foregoing characterization of his jurisprudence. 
He surely has a strong set of political inclinations, most of which 
could be described as libertarian. But those inclinations are not 
connected to a stable constitutional theory. Instead, Justice Scalia 
selects from a large and eclectic set of constitutional principles 
those that best suit his purposes in a given case. If the principles 
he employs in one case prove inconvenient in the next, he casually 
abandons them. The result is that, although it is usually easy to 
predict how he will vote in a constitutional case, it is often difficult 
to predict how he will justify his vote.48 
Fisher goes on to analyze various aspects of Scalia's opinion in 
Lucas, such as his treatment of constitutional history, his discussion 
of conceptual segmentation (the "denominator issue"),49 his creation 
of the nuisance exception to the new total regulatory takings rule of 
Lucas,50 and his cynical view of legislators.51 Fisher concludes that 
Scalia's takings jurisprudence is in fact anything but systematic and 
consistent. Fisher suggests, charitably perhaps, that while the source 
45 See Michael J. Klarman, The Puzzling Resistance to Political Process Theary, 77 VA. L. 
REV. 747, 825 (1991) (quoting Louisiana v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459 (1947) (Jackson, J., draft 
concurrence) (Dec. 1946) (LOC, Jackson Papers, Box 138, case file no. 142». 
46 William W. Fischer III, The Trouble With Lucas, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1393, 1393 (1993) 
(critiquing Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992». 
47 Id. 
48 Id. at 1394. 
49 Id. at 14034>5. 
50 Id at 1405-08. 
51 Fischer, supra note 46, at 1408-09. 
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of Scalia's inconsistencies is uncertain, "one possibility is that Justice 
Scalia has not adequately thought through the foundations of his 
constitutional theory."52 
Professor John Humbach in his article, "'Taking'the Imperial Ju-
diciary Seriously: Segmentating Property Interests and Judicial Re-
vision of Legislative Judgments,"53 also focuses attention on Justice 
Scalia's jurisprudence. For instance, Professor Humbach points out 
an ironic temporal juxtaposition: 
On the day the Supreme Court decided Lucas v. South Carolina 
Coastal Council, Justice Antonin Scalia, who wrote the Lucas 
majority opinion, declared with plain chagrin: "The Imperial Ju-
diciary lives." He criticized his ''unelected, life-tenured" colleagues 
in the strongest terms for allowing the Court to succumb to the 
"more natural direction" of its temptation-the direction of "sys-
tematically eliminating checks upon its own power." He cited the 
fears of Lincoln that "if the policy of the Government upon vital 
questions affecting the whole people is to be irrevocably fixed by 
decisions of the Supreme Court, ... the people will have ceased 
to be their own rulers, having to that extent practically resigned 
their Government into the hands of that imminent tribunal."54 
The real irony is that Justice Scalia's opinion in Lucas is an example 
of superactive, categorical judicial review. 55 Thus, on the very day that 
Justice Scalia laments and criticizes "judicial imperialism," Scalia too 
was arguably a judicial imperialist.56 
Subjectivity and inconsistency in Supreme Court land-use jurispru-
dence are nothing new. As I pointed out in my earlier" Presumption 
52Id. at 1397. 
53 See John A. Humbach, "Taking" The Imperial Judiciary Seriously: Segmenting Property 
Interests and Judicial Revision of Legislative Judgments, 42 CATH. U. L. REV. 771 (1993). 
54 Id. 
55 For a discussion of Justice Scalia's superactive, categorical review see Robert J. Hopperton, 
Standards of Judicial Review In Supreme Court Land Use Opinions: A Taxonomy, an Ana-
lytical Framework, and a Synthesis, 51 WASH. U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 1,67 (1997). 
56 Judicial activism is a vague, open-ended term. To measure degrees of judicial activism, many 
dimensions or elements may be relevant. I will propose in an upcoming article the following ten 
dimensions as possible measuring devices of the phenomenon of judicial activism: 1) Standards 
of Judicial Review; 2) Treatment of Non-Judicial Decision; 3) Attitude Toward Non-Judicial 
Decision-Maker; 4) Treatment of Prudential Doctrines (Standing, Ripeness, etc.); 5) Treatment 
of Relevant Precedent; 6) Treatment of Relevant Constitutional Provision; 7) Judicial Policy-
Making; 8) Judicial Identification of Alternative Policy-Maker; 9) Judicial Specificity Regarding 
Policy-Making; and 10) Treatment of Remedial Issues. Applying these ten dimensions to the 
Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council majority opinion leads to a conclusion that in Lucas 
Justice Scalia was highly activist on most of the ten measures and produced perhaps the most 
activist opinion in the history of Supreme Court land-use jurisprudence. 
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of Validity" article,57 they have been present since early Supreme 
Court zoning cases such as Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty CO.58 
and Nectow v. City of Cambridge.59 
The Supreme Court in Euclid held that "[i]f the validity of the 
legislative classification for zoning purposes be fairly debatable, the 
legislative judgment must be allowed to control."60 Implicit in the 
Euclid holding is the placement of the burden of proof on the party 
challenging the zoning ordinance.6! The Court expressly defined the 
level or standard of proof that the challenger must overcome: if the 
law's validity is "fairly debatable," then the law must stand.62 
Interestingly, in his Euclid majority opinion, Justice George Suth-
erland cited to Radice v. New York regarding the validity of legisla-
tive zoning classifications.63 Radice was not a land-use case. Rather, 
Radice dealt with due process and equal protection challenges to a 
New York statute prohibiting night employment of women in restau-
rants.64 In Radice, Sutherland's discussion of the presumption of va-
lidity is more detailed than his one-sentence holding in Euclid: 
The legislature had before it a mass of information from which it 
concluded that night work is substantially and especially detri-
mental to the health of women .... Where the constitutional va-
lidity of the statute depends upon the existence of facts, courts 
must be cautious about reaching a conclusion respecting them 
contrary to that reached by the legislature; and if the question of 
what the facts established be a fairly debatable one, it is not 
permissible for the judge to set up his opinion in respect of it 
against the opinion of the lawmaker. The state legislature here 
determined that night employment of the character specified, was 
sufficiently detrimental to the health and welfare of women en-
gaging in it to justify its suppression; and, since we are unable to 
say that the finding is clearly unfounded, we are precluded from 
reviewing the legislative determination.65 
In Euclid, Justice Sutherland relied on this more extensive discus-
sion that recognizes separation of powers considerations, the ability 
67 See Hopperton, supra note 5, at 306-10. 
68 272 U.S. 365 (1926). 
59 277 U.S. 183 (1928). 
60 Euclid, 272 U.S. at 388 (citing Radice v. New York, 264 U.S. 292, 294 (1923». 
61 See id. 
ffl.Id. 
63 Id. (citing Radice, 264 U.S. at 294). 
64 Radice, 264 U.S. at 293. 
66 Id. at 294-95. 
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of the legislature to generate a mass of information, and an estab-
lished factual basis for the legislative judgment, as contributing fac-
tors to the Supreme Court's decision to defer to the New York state 
legislature.66 Justice Sutherland mentioned the "fairly debatable" stand-
ard of proof and, significantly, indicated that because the Supreme 
Court was unable to say that the legislative finding was not a "valid 
exercise of authority" it could not invalidate the New York legisla-
tion.67 
The Radice and Euclid opinions established the model for a defer-
ential standard of judicial review of local land-use decisions.68 The 
Euclid model starts with the presumption of validity and includes 
burden of proof and standard of proof components.69 
The Euclid presumption of validity approach articulated by Justice 
Sutherland soon created problems in later cases for Justice Suther-
land and the rest of the United States Supreme Court. In its 1928 
decision in Nectow v. City of Cambridge, with Sutherland again writ-
ing for the majority, the Supreme Court considered the reasonable-
ness of a multiple-family residential zoning classification as applied to 
a portion of plaintiff N ectow's property.70 N ectow's property was lo-
cated between single-family residential and other land zoned for and 
being used for industrial purposes.71 In other words, Cambridge had 
created a buffer zone between two incompatible zones-a widely 
accepted zoning technique.72 
Even though the Court was dealing with a legislative classification, 
Justice Sutherland indicated that a "court should not set aside the 
determination of public officers in such a matter unless it is clear that 
their action [is unreasonable]."73 Ironically, however, the Court invali-
dated the Cambridge regulation because the "invasion of the property 
66 Euclid, 272 U.S. at 388. 
67 [d. at 388-89, 397. 
68 See id. at 391-95. 
69 See id. at 387, 395-96. 
70 Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183, 185 (1928). 
71 [d. at 186. 
72 A buffer zone is "a strip of land, identified in the zoning ordinance, established to protect 
one type of land-use from another with which it is incompatible. Buffer zones may either be 
shown on the zoning map or described in the ordinance with reference to neighboring districts. 
Where a commercial district abuts a residential district, for example, additional use, yard, or 
height restrictions may be imposed to protect residential properties." MICHAEL J. MESHEN-
BERG, THE LANGUAGE OF ZONING: A GLOSSARY OF WORDS AND PHRASES 6 (1976). 
73 Nectow, 277 U.S. at 187-88 (citing Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 395 
(1926». 
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of plaintiff in error was serious and highly injurious .... "74 Conspicu-
ously absent from Justice Sutherland's opinion was discussion of the 
Euclid presumption of validity, burden of proof, or the "fairly debat-
able standard."75 Justice Sutherland's avoidance of these standards 
was particularly interesting in view of the Massachusetts Supreme 
Judicial Court's adherence to the Euclid standards in upholding the 
reasonableness of the Cambridge buffer zone: 
If there is to be zoning at all, the dividing line must be drawn 
somewhere. There cannot be a twilight zone. If residence districts 
are to exist, they must be bounded. In the nature of things, the 
location of the precise limits of the several districts demands the 
exercise of judgment and sagacity. There can be no standard 
susceptible of mathematical exactness in its application. Opinions 
of the wise and good well may differ as to the place to put the 
separation between different districts. Seemingly there would be 
great difficulty in pronouncing a scheme for zoning unreasonable 
and capricious because it embraced land on both sides of the same 
street in one district instead of making the center of the street 
the dividing line .... No physical features of the locus stamp it as 
land improper for residence. Indeed, its accessibility to means of 
transportation, to centers of business, and to seats of learning, as 
well as its proximity to land given over to residence purposes, 
give to it many of the attributes desirable for land to be used for 
residence .... Courts cannot set aside the decision of public officers 
in such a matter unless compelled to the conclusion that it has no 
foundation in reason and is a mere arbitrary or irrational exercise 
of power having no substantial relation to the public health, the 
public morals, the public safety, or the public welfare in its proper 
sense. These considerations cannot be waived with exactness. 
That they demand the placing of the boundary of a zone one 
hundred feet one way or the other in land having similar material 
features would be hard to say as matter of law .... The case at 
bar is close to the line. But we do not feel justified in holding that 
the zoning line established is whimsical, without foundation in 
reason.76 
The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court had, in effect, faithfully 
applied and administered the Euclid presumption of validity, burden 
of proof, beyond fair debate standard.77 While that court may have 
had doubts about the legislative judgment, that judgment was not 
74 [d. at 188--89. 
75 See id. at 185--88. 
76 Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 157 N.E. 618, 620 (Mass. 1927), rev'd, 277 U.S. 183 (1928). 
77 See id. 
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clearly unfounded.78 The Nectow opinion written by Justice Suther-
land, on the other hand, engaged in less deferential and more active 
scrutiny in invalidating the legislative judgment, even though there 
was obviously fair debate about reasonableness.79 As a result, the 
Nectow decision generated confusion because the Euclid approach 
was not overruled, although Nectow implicitly called Euclid into ques-
tion and, without explanation, introduced a new, unarticulated, height-
ened level of judicial review.so 
The Supreme Court's unexplained change of position to a more 
heightened scrutiny of legislative decision-making muddied the wa-
ters regarding the appropriate standard of judicial review in zoning 
cases. The uncertainty about judicial review standards and the pre-
sumption of validity continued without clarification, as the United 
States Supreme Court did not take another zoning case for almost 
fifty years.81 
V. DEMOCRACY, DISTRUST, AND DISCLOSURE 
The disclosure principle is that justices avow the true grounds of deci-
sion.82 
Judicial review is "a counter-majoritarian force" in our democracy.83 
The personal predilections and the web of subjectivityB4 identified by 
both Justices themselves and by professional critics of the Supreme 
Court heighten the distrust, and lead directly to the search for rules 
of limitation, for a basis for legitimacy, and for a set of constraints. 
This search in turn generates the sound and fury of an endless series 
of "choices"85 among constitutional theories and methods of constitu-
tional interpretation. Professors Mandelker and Tarlock's presump-
tion-based approach for judicial review of land-use regulation adds 
one more choice. 
What I present is neither another theory nor another choice but 
rather a modest proposal to help approach the perhaps "intractable"86 
78 See id. 
79 See Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183, 188--89 (1928). 
80 See id. 
81 The next zoning case decided by the Supreme Court was Village of Belle Thrre v. Boraas, 
416 U.S. 1 (1974). 
82 This sentence is a paraphrased version of a sentence in an article by Judge Richard A. 
Posner, Jurisprudence of Skepticism, 86 MICH. L. REV. 827, 864 (1988). 
83 BICKEL, supra note 40, at 16. 
84 See supra Section IV. 
85 See supra Section II. 
86 Mandelker and Tarlock conclude the following in their recent reply: 
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problem of standards of judicial review. My suggestion is that there 
should be an established and entrenched expectation that Justices 
explicitly disclose the standards of judicial review that they are adopt-
ing whenever they review non-judicial public decision-making such as 
a local legislative or administrative land-use decision. More specifically, 
the Justices should disclose the premises and reasoning processes 
behind their conclusions and the implications and details related to 
their deployment of a given standard of judicial review, whether it be 
deferential, heightened, activist, or categorical judicial review,87 whether 
it entails minimal, intermediate, or strict scrutiny. As one of the 
critical dimensions of judicial review,88 the standard of judicial review 
employed by a Justice deserves special attention. This choice guides 
the Justices' review and disposition of the various substantive issues 
on the merits. 
Let me provide a context for the disclosure principle. First, as I 
have said earlier, it is not new. Judges already observe an established 
and entrenched obligation to write opinions justifying their decisions on 
substantive issues. This is a long-recognized convention that judges 
write opinions explaining and justifying their decisions in terms of 
legal precedents and principles.89 This convention traditionally ex-
tends only to the judges' decisions on substantive issues on their 
merits. The expectation that judges write opinions and provide rea-
sons has a long history that was strongly reinforced by proponents of 
the Harvard Legal Process School,90 most particularly in the influen-
tial, but until recently not published, work of Henry M. Hart, Jr. and 
Albert M. Sacks, The Legal Process: Basic Problems in the Making 
and Application of Law.91 As Hart and Sacks suggest, the judge must 
The ultimate issue that land-use challenges raise is, of course, what is the appropriate 
level of judicial scrutiny of a local legislative or administrative decision? Based on our 
collective seventy-plus years of struggling with land-use controls law, we find this an 
almost intractable question which can be approached but not "solved." 
Mandelker & Tarlock, supra note 1, at 107. A significant reason why the appropriate level of 
judicial scrutiny is "almost intractable" is, I would submit, the courts' lack of candor, clarity and 
consistency when dealing with standards of judicial review. 
87 See Hopperton, supra note 55. 
88 See supra note 56. 
89 For a history of the judicial function in the administration of justice in England, see R.J. 
WALKER, THE ENGLISH LEGAL SYSTEM 183--84 (2d ed. 1985). 
90 KUKLIN & STEMPEL, supra note 8; see generally G. Edward White, The Evolution of 
Reasoned Elaboration: Jurisprudential Criticism and Social Change, 59 VA. L. REV. 279 
(1973). 
91 See generally HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACHS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC 
PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW (William N. Eskridge & Phillip P. 
Frickey eds., 1994). 
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do more than state his conclusions; unless the judge provides a "rea-
soned elaboration" for his conclusion: 
The parties will have no idea of the basis of his decision; and the 
losing party, being left in the dark may be harder to convince that 
the decision is just .... Perhaps even more important, other pri-
vate persons will have no aid in planning future conduct.92 
Later, in discussing the topic "Reasoned Decision as Integral in the 
Concept of Adjudication,"93 Hart and Sacks discuss the need for a 
judicial decision, if it is to be rational, to be based on "some rule or 
principle or standard,"94 and then conclude that "if the decision is not 
disciplined by the effort to relate conclusions to premises of general 
applicability, then it must necessarily depend on an ad-hoc judgment."95 
My premise is that disclosure of standards of judicial review, i.e., 
reasoned elaboration of those standards' creation and use by the 
Justices, will enhance the clarity, consistency, and integrity of land-
use jurisprudence.96 This use of disclosure can help reconcile the ex-
ercise of a power by an unelected, life-tenured judiciary with the 
majoritarian foundations of our political system. Through the crucible 
of disclosure, discussion, professional criticism, and debate, a better, 
less "intractable," land-use jurisprudence can emerge. I would im-
plore the Justices to embrace and practice disclosure and reasoned 
elaboration regarding their standards of judicial review.97 
92 [d. at 357. 
93 [d. at 643. 
94 [d. at 644. 
95 [d. 
96 A jurisprudential skeptic such as Judge Richard Posner suggests that books dealing with 
constitutional theory and methods of constitutional interpretation such as Ely's DEMOCRACY 
AND DISTRUST operate under "considerable handicaps-I) judges and constitutional orders are 
poorly informed about their subject matter-a complex of political, social, and economic ques-
tions;" and 2) the fact that most judicial decisions today are written by law clerks just out of 
law school. The disclosure principle would obligate justices themselves to do more, i.e., explain 
their thinking about judicial review. In order to meet this obligation, I believe that a justice 
would first have to get more involved with the political, social, and economic facts that would 
justify his or her adoption of a given standard of judicial review and, second, justices would need 
to master-to a much greater extent that is evident in any recent Supreme Court land use 
cases-what professors and professional critics of constitutional law teach, study, and publish 
about the available "constitutional choices" that confront them. 
97 The reaction of a second-year law student to the disclosure/reasoned elaboration principle 
was the following comment: "Every first-year law student understands this concept, i.e., that a 
justice whether writing a majority, concurring, or dissenting opinion would have an obligation 
to "IRAC" the problem of standards of judicial review." After-class conversation with Elisabet 
K. Sandberg, Second-Year Law Student, University of Toldeo College of Law (Sept. 1996). 
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VI. A USEFUL EXAMPLE OF DISCLOSURE: CITY OF CLEBURNE V. 
CLEBURNE LIVING CENTER 
Candor requires me to acknowledge the particular factors that justify 
invalidating Cleburne's zoning ordinance under the careful scrutiny it 
today receives.98 
-Thurgood Marshall 
In a recent article,99 I provide a taxonomy and an analytical frame-
work for one dimension of Supreme Court judicial review of land-use 
regulations i.e., the standards of judicial review-those standards 
that the Court creates and uses to guide its review and disposition of 
particular land-use cases on their merits. Second, I apply the taxon-
omy and framework to the vast number of land-use opinions authored 
by Supreme Court justices. In applying the taxonomy and the frame-
work to the more than 120 Supreme Court land-use opinions, it is 
quite clear that the "no set formula"lOo label is perhaps as applicable 
to standards of judicial review as it has been applicable to the takings 
issue. However, "no set formula" is probably an understatement re-
garding judicial review. Subjectivity, analytical laxness, unelaborated 
premises, novel use of history, and inconsistency are more accurate 
descriptions.lOl While undoubtedly there are several standards of ju-
dicial review apparent in Supreme Court land-use jurisprudence, there 
neither is consensus on their underlying principles, their applications, 
or their policy bases, nor is there any recognized expectation of dis-
closure or of reasoned elaboration regarding this dimension of judicial 
review. 
This state of affairs perhaps is, in some ways, a positive. Standards 
of judicial review are not frozen into some Procrustean Mold and 
creative new approaches can be tried, although those new approaches 
sometimes lead to rigid new per se rules.lo2 In this disarray, the Court 
can react flexibly to changing times and new demands. 
98 City of Cleburne, Tex. v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 460 (1985). 
99 See generally Hopperton, supra note 55. 
100 Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978). Justice William 
Brennan remarked in a phrase that has become an often-used description of Supreme Court 
treatment of the Takings Issue that, "this Court, quite simply, has been unable to develop any 
'set formula' for determining when 'justice and fairness' require" compensation. Id. 
101 See Hopperton, supra note 55, at 1, 74. 
102 See id. at 75. 
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However, there is a distinct downside to the confusion. It invites 
the knight-errant on a crusade whether he or she be a liberal protect-
ing fundamental rights or a conservative promoting property rights. 
The already present "counter-majoritarian difficulty" is exacerbated. 
Personal predilections can dominate and be disguised at the same 
time. Moreover, a reading of the massive writings in the realm of 
constitutional theory published since Alexander Bickel's The Least 
Dangerous BranchlO3 in 1962 indicates that no workable and generally 
accepted substantive means of constraining judicial discretion has 
emerged, or is likely to emerge soon.104 
To address this confusion, I have suggested that an "entrenched 
expectation" be established to the effect that Justices would in every 
opinion engage in "reasoned elaboration"105 of their selection of a 
standard of judicial review. This procedural expectation would obli-
gate Justices to disclose their premises for deploying deferential ju-
dicial review, or heightened judicial review, or activist judicial review, 
etc., and to set forth their reasoning process with regard to this 
dimension of the judicial decision-making process. 
The disclosure of reasons for a Justice's jurisprudential thinking, 
i.e., reasoned elaboration, is a core principle of the legal process school 
of jurisprudence.106 It is a technique advanced as a useful constraint 
in a democratic society on judicial imperialism and personal judicial 
predilections. While reasoned elaboration, or disclosure of reasons, 
has its limitations, and has been labeled obsolescentlO7 by some, I 
would assert that, in the welter of conflicting, contradictory, and often 
unelaborated Supreme Court approaches to judicial review, reasoned 
elaboration retains contemporary value. 
The colloquy undertaken by Justices Byron White, John Paul Stevens, 
and Thurgood Marshall in CleburnelO8 is a useful example. In that 
case, there were sharp disagreements, points and counter-points, and 
critical evaluations of opposing positions regarding competing stand-
ards of judicial review. The Justices engaging in that colloquy dis-
closed, informed, and educated, while also advancing and maturing 
103 BICKEL, supra note 40. 
104 See generally id. 
105 For a discussion of ''reasoned elaboration," see G. Edward White, The Evolution of Rea-
soned Elaboration: Jurisprudential Criticism and Social Change, 59 VA. L. REV. 279, 287-94 
(1973). 
106 [d. at 299. 
10'7 [d. 
108 City of Cleburne, Tex. v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 470 (1985). 
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their own thinking and analysis. When compared to the silence of 
Justice Sutherland in Nectow109 or the novel, hyper-activism of Justice 
Scalia in Lucas,llo the combination of fully engaged opinions in Cle-
burne stands out in refreshing and constructive contrast. 
If in a democratic society, the premise of distrust does attach to the 
judiciary, then the type of discussion and disclosure undertaken in 
Cleburne can operate as a modest but useful constraint on Justices as 
they select a standard of judicial review. 
VII. CONCLUSION: WHAT DISCLOSURE CAN Do 
In Chapter Five of his book, Other People's Money/ll Louis Bran-
deis (later Justice Brandeis) discussed what disclosure-Brandeis called 
it "publicity" -can do. 
WHAT PUBLICITY CAN DO 
Publicity is justly commended as a remedy for social and indus-
trial diseases. Sunlight is said to be the best of disinfectants; 
electric light the most efficient policeman. And publicity has al-
ready played an important part of the struggle against the money 
trust. The Pujo Committee has, in the disclosure of the facts 
concerning financial concentration, made a most important contri-
bution toward obtainment of the New Freedom. The battlefield 
has been surveyed and charted. The hostile forces have been 
located, counted and appraised. That was a necessary first step-
and a long one-towards relief. The provision in the Committee's 
bill concerning the incorporation of stock exchanges and the state-
ment to be made in connection with the listing of securities would 
doubtless have a beneficent effect, but there should be a further 
call upon publicity for service. That potent force must, in the 
impending struggle, be utilized in many ways as a continuous 
remedial measure.1l2 
Disclosure can be a helpful, continuous, remedial measure in land-use 
jurisprudence too. It can help in searching out the web of subjectivity, 
it can help locate, count, and appraise possible personal predilections 
of Justices. Erratic subjectivity of judgment, analytical laxness, intel-
lectual incoherence, the imagining of too much history, and the ma-
nipulation of technical requirements will be harder to disguise. Dis-
109 Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 272 U.S. 183 (1928). 
110 Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992). 
111 See LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE'S MONEY AND How THE BANKERS USE IT 
92-109 (1913). 
112 [d. 
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closure can be a continuous, remedial measure to combat the possible 
excesses of a counter-majoritarian force. 
Disclosure, however, is obviously no panacea. Skeptics will say it 
would be little more than a theoretical or academic limitation on 
Justices,113 and that clever, manipUlative, intellectually dishonest jus-
tices can easily circumvent a disclosure obligation to achieve their 
desired ends. However, an established and entrenched obligation to 
disclose would up the ante, it would add another filter, it would make 
judicial sophistry that much more difficult. It would provide another 
petard upon which Justices might hoist themselves. It would make 
Justices more self-conscious. It would add another measure for law 
professors and professional critics to use in the marketplace of juris-
prudential thought.n4 It would be an aide in the dialectical processes. 
In short, disclosure by a court of its reasons and reasoning process 
regarding standards of judicial review is a protection against an un-
bridled judiciary. In the face of such an expectation or obligation, any 
court, trial or appellate, that does not justify the standards it creates 
and uses to guide its review and disposition of the substantive issues 
it is deciding on their merits would be, and should be, subject to 
sustained professional criticism. 
Disclosure-Panacea, no; helpful continuing remedy, yes. Two cheers 
for Truth in Jurisprudence. 
113 See generally Arthur S. Miller, In Defense of Judicial Activism, in SUPREME COURT 
ACTIVISM AND RESTRAINT 176 (Steven C. Halpern & Charles M. Lamb eds., 1982). 
114 As Judge Richard A. Posner asserted: 
The effectiveness of professional critics in constraining judicial behavior is enhanced 
by the tradition (now on the wane in the federal courts of appeals) that the judge must 
explain his decision in a published opinion, which if it falls below professional expecta-
tions of principled judicial decision making may become a focus of searing criticism. 
RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM 22 (1985). 
